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INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following situation occurs in a nearby school
district.' Some parents, concerned that their school district's teaching
1. This hypothetical is loosely based on events that recently transpired in
Pennsylvania and Kansas. See, e.g., Jodi Wilgoren, In Evolution Debate, A Counterattack,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2006, § 4, at 3 (describing attempts to include intelligent design in
curriculums in Kansas and Pennsylvania).
The situations that occurred in both
Pennsylvania and Kansas differ slightly from the facts in this hypothetical.
In
Pennsylvania, the Dover school board approved a statement, to be read at the beginning
of the semester in high school biology classes, which said that evolutionary theory was
imperfect and that students should explore intelligent design as an alternative. Laurie
Goodstein, Intelligent Design Might Be Meeting Its Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, § 4, at
1. In the Dover case, a federal district court struck down the school board's actions for
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of evolution does not correspond with the religious beliefs they would
like to impart to their children, advocate the addition of intelligent
design2 to the school system's biology curriculum.' " '[I]ntelligent
design theory' ... [posits that] organisms are so perfectly formed that
they must be the products of a conscious designer."4
The parents then take their case before the local school board.5
The school board, finding the issue to be of the utmost importance,

holds a series of hearings on the matter. Both the supporters and the
detractors of intelligent design focus their arguments on the relative
scientific merits of the theory. Advocates of intelligent design argue

to the board that, while they accept the basic premises of evolutionary
theory,6 there are certain gaps in the theory that cannot be explained
by traditional evolutionary principles.7 This group of advocates
violating the Establishment Clause. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp.
2d 707, 766 (M.D. Pa. 2005). In Kansas, the board of education adopted policies disputing
the validity of evolution, but the State did not formally introduce intelligent design in the
classroom. See Laurie Goodstein, Issuing Rebuke, Judge Rejects Teaching of Intelligent
Design, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2005, at Al. In August 2006, however, the voters of Kansas
seemed to show a preference for proevolution school board candidates, electing slightly
more evolution proponents than intelligent design supporters. This may allow the new
school board to overturn the previous intelligent design policies. See Editorial, The
Evolution of Kansas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2006, at A20.
2. See Karen Schmidt, Creationists Evolve New Strategy, SCIENCE, July 26, 1996, at
420, 421.
3. Supreme Court precedent implies that it is unconstitutional to preclude the
teaching of evolution in school altogether. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-89
(1987) (noting that a statute advancing creationism did not further academic freedom
because it would have been permissible under the statute to teach neither evolution nor
creationism). Advocates of intelligent design contend that intelligent design is not
religious and that teaching the theory in public schools conforms with Edwards. See Neil
Munro, DebatingDesign, NAT'L J., Jan. 7, 2006, at 36, 40.
4. Schmidt, supra note 2, at 420, 421.
5. The debate over evolution has been staged in many forums, "but in recent years,
[these debates have occurred] most sharply at the meetings of local school boards, where
elected members set policies for grades K-12 science education." Munro, supra note 3, at
37.
6. "Intelligent-design proponents generally do not deny... that creatures and plants
evolve." Id. at 39.
7. The main argument of intelligent design advocates is
that nature's complexity, such as the anatomy of the human eye or the multistep
chemical process that coagulates blood, cannot be fundamentally explained by
material causes, random mutations, and the "survival of the fittest" doctrine, as
evolution theory says. Intelligent-design advocates assert, for example, that the
biology of blood clotting could not have evolved piece by piece, because it doesn't
work unless all of the necessary mechanisms and proteins are present. These
theorists say that something else is needed to explain the origin of mankind,
biological complexity, and other "loose ends" of evolution, and that that
something else is "intelligent design."
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suggests that teaching intelligent design would help to fill in some of
these gaps, assisting students to better understand the physical world
in which they live. The advocates for intelligent design do not
recommend that the school board teach schoolchildren that an
intelligent designer exists, merely that there are some gaps in

evolutionary theory which must be explained through other means.8
The opponents of intelligent design speaking at the hearing
vigorously attack the scientific legitimacy of the theory? They
present evidence to the board, backed by many leading scientific
experts, that the gaps in evolutionary theory perceived by supporters
of intelligent design are not truly gaps and can be explained
adequately by evolutionary theory."° Finally, the detractors of
intelligent design point out that intelligent design is not a traditional
scientific theory because it cannot be tested through an experiment
proving (or disproving) the existence of an intelligent designer."
After careful deliberation, the school board decides to reject the
addition of intelligent design to the school system's curriculum, 2
Id. at 38-39.
8. John West, the associate director of the Discovery Institute's Center for Science
and Culture (one of the most vocal proponents of intelligent design), agrees that school
boards should not advocate that an intelligent designer exists. See id. at 39. Indeed, most
intelligent design proponents do not publicly argue that the Judeo-Christian God is the
intelligent designer in the theory. Id.
9. The scientific validity of intelligent design has been seriously criticized by the
scientific community. Indeed, one author went so far as to say that "[p]ractically all
leading scientists oppose the intelligent-design argument, root and branch." Id. at 40.
Conversely, the theory of evolution has general scientific acceptance. Eric Rothschild, an
attorney for a group of parents challenging intelligent design in the Dover case, described
the debate in terms to which lawyers could relate: "Scientists are debating the theory of
evolution to the same extent that lawyers are debating Marbury v. Madison-the lunatic
fringe only." Margaret Graham Tebo, An Evolving Conflict, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2006, at 20,
22.
10. Scientists provide numerous examples for this argument:
For example, scientists argue, organs that appear irreducibly complex-such as the
human eye, with its interdependent lens and optical nerve--evolved from simpler
light-sensing organs, and gradually discarded superfluous cells and features, just as
an arch in a cathedral now stands without the scaffolding that made its
construction possible. Similarly, blood coagulation, [scientists] say, can be shown
to have evolved in steps, as nature mixed and matched proteins and processes
already used for other biological purposes.
Munro, supra note 3, at 41.
11. See id.
12. Generally, a school board has broad discretion in setting the school system's
curriculum. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (noting that the
state has the power to "reasonably ... regulate all schools," and that within this power is
the ability to ensure "that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public
welfare"); Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 181 (4th Cir.
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explicitly basing its decision on the perceived flimsiness of the
scientific evidence supporting the theory.13 Not surprisingly, the
parents are unsatisfied with the decision of the school board. They

decide to take their grievance to federal district court, challenging the
school

board's decision not to add intelligent design

to the

curriculum.
Two legal theories form the basis of the parents' challenge to the
school board's decision.

Their first theory is based on Pierce v.

Society of Sisters,4 which courts have often interpreted as giving
parents the right to direct their children's upbringing and education. 5
The parents argue that having their children exposed to intelligent
design is essential to their children's upbringing. This is in part due to

the parents' religious objections to evolution; they desire to raise their
1996) (upholding, after applying rational basis review, a school board's decision to require
community service as a prerequisite for graduation); see also JAMES A. RAPP, 5
EDUCATION LAW § 11.02 (2006) ("The authority of local boards over curriculum is well
established. Subject to overriding federal and state authority where exercised, the local
school board 'has complete discretion in determining what courses shall be offered,
continued, or discontinued.'" (quoting LEROY J. PETERSON ET AL., THE LAW AND
PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION 380 (1969)).
13. Munro, supra note 3, at 41.
14. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
15. Id. at 534-35. The Pierce right is rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (stating that "[i]n
a long line of cases, [the Supreme Court has] held that, in addition to the specific freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights, the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause
includes the right[] ... to direct the education and upbringing of one's children" (citing
Pierce, 268 U.S. 510)). At a minimum, the Pierce right gives the "custodial parent ... a
constitutional right to determine, without undue interference by the state, how best to
raise, nurture, and educate the child." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 95 (2000)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. The exact scope of the
Pierce right, however, is debatable. See discussion infra Part I.C.; see also Troxel, 530 U.S
at 95-96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (recognizing the existence of the Pierce right but noting
that "courts must use considerable restraint, including careful adherence to the
incremental instruction given by the precise facts of particular cases, as they seek to give
further and more precise definition to the right").
[A]lthough the Supreme Court keeps re-affirming that the "primary role of the
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition," the federal courts tend generally to treat Pierce like
a quirky aged relative who, although she is still invited to Thanksgiving dinner, is
watched nervously for fear she will embarrass the family and start tossing mashed
potatoes.
Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious Education, and Harm
to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 125-26 (2000) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)); see also James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's
Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1447 (1994)
(arguing that "[c]ourts should acknowledge the illegitimacy of the parents' rights doctrine
and decline to recognize claims of parental rights in the future").

2006]

HYBRID RIGHTS

children to question evolution. Intelligent design, a theory meant to
point out flaws in evolutionary theory, is essential in furthering this
parental objective. The parents also favor the teaching of intelligent
design because they want their children to be able to evaluate for
themselves which theories they believe. 6
The parents' second theory is based on the First Amendment's
Free Exercise Clause. 7 They argue that the decision of the school
board impinges on their ability to teach their children to question
evolution, something the parents feel is very important to their
religion.'" This claim is considerably similar to their Pierce claim in
substance. After all, the parents really have one main complaint
about the school board's decision: their children now will not learn
about intelligent design in school, a fact that has religious implications
for the parents.
As a result of the standards of judicial scrutiny given to these
claims, both claims would likely fail if brought individually. 9 Under
the hybrid rights doctrine,2" however, established by the Supreme
Court in Employment Division v. Smith,2' a free exercise claim
combined with another constitutional claim is given higher scrutiny.22
The parents in this claim appear to have stated a valid hybrid rights
claim by melding a free exercise claim with a Pierce claim, another
constitutional right. Thus, at least at first glance, the school board
will have to justify its decision in the face of heightened scrutiny, and
the parents may have a good chance of success. This outcome seems
odd because separately their claims would likely fail. It seems even
more peculiar due to the fact that the claims are basically the same in
substance.

16. Cf. Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 288 (5th Cir. 2001)
(describing parents' challenge to uniform policy because it "interfere[s] with their parental
rights to teach their children to be guided by one's own conscience in making decisions, to
understand the importance of appropriate grooming and attire, to understand the
importance of one's own individuality, and to respect the individuality of others").
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof").
18. This Comment assumes, for argument's sake, that intelligent design is rooted in
religion. It should be noted, however, that commentators have persuasively argued that
intelligent design should not be treated as rooted in religion. See Mary Katherine
Hackney, Comment, Is This Apple for Teacher an Apple From Eve? Reanalyzing the
Intelligent Design Debatefrom a Curricular Perspective, 85 N.C. L. REV. 349, 357 (2006).
19. See infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
20. See discussion infra Part III.
21. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
22. See id. at 881-82.
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The hypothetical above illustrates the dangers associated with
giving heightened scrutiny to parental claims challenging school
action as not conforming to their religious beliefs. Further, while this
Introduction deals with the problem in terms of a hypothetical, the
issue is very real and has come before the lower courts in a variety of
cases.2 3 Because almost all parents' objections to school policy based
on religious concerns can be melded with a Pierce claim, the hybrid
rights doctrine risks causing a fundamental transformation in the
education arena. While school boards in the past knew that their
decisions would be upheld if they could show a rational basis for their
decision, the hybrid rights doctrine, at first glance, appears to require
school boards to survive heightened scrutiny whenever parents claim
that a school board's actions intrude upon their religious philosophy.
This transformation in standards poses the risk of making individual
parents, rather than elected school officials, the de facto decisionmakers on certain curricular matters. Even more troubling, given the
myriad religions in the United States, is that the number and variety
of these claims has the potential to be virtually limitless-a daunting
task to face for a school board charged with the duty of creating a
consistent, coherent school curriculum.24
23. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 135, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2003)
(involving a father who argued that the hybrid combination of the Pierce right and the free
exercise claim should excuse his son from health class requirements the father did not
agree with); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 293 n.27 (5th Cir. 2001)
(involving parents who originally made an argument that a combination of the Pierce right
and the free exercise claim should allow an exemption for their child from uniform policy),
Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 696, 699-700 (10th Cir. 1998)
(involving a parent who argued that the hybrid combination of the Pierce right and the
free exercise claim should allow the child to attend school for half a day).
24. Of course, this statement implicitly incorporates the notion that free exercise
claims as a normative matter should be reviewed under rational basis scrutiny. See Smith,
494 U.S. at 879 ("[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).' " (quoting U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment))). The holding in Smith can be debated, both on a normative and a positive
basis. See, e.g., id. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("In my view, today's
holding dramatically departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence, appears
unnecessary to resolve the question presented, and is incompatible with our Nation's
fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty."); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio
State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (describing the hybrid rights doctrine
established in Smith as "illogical"); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free
Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 308 (1991) ("defend[ing] Smith's rejection of
the constitutionally compelled free exercise exemption against [Michael W.] McConnell's
critique"); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1990) ("suggest[ing] that Smith is contrary to the deep logic of
the First Amendment"). For better or worse, however, the rational basis approach of
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This Comment argues that hybrid claims based on parents
melding a free exercise claim with a Pierce claim in the education
context should be given rational basis scrutiny upon judicial review.
Part I of this Comment will look into the case background and policy
reasons forming the basis of the parental Pierce right to direct the
upbringing of children. This Part will show that the Pierce right
usually receives lower judicial scrutiny. Part II will explore the state
of pure free exercise claims after the Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith. This Part will show that free exercise
claims after Smith are usually afforded lower judicial scrutiny. Part
III will investigate the hybrid rights doctrine established in Smith,
under which a free exercise claim merged with another constitutional
claim can be given heightened judicial scrutiny. Part IV will
specifically explore the hybrid rights doctrine in situations where a
free exercise claim is merged with a Pierce parental rights claim. This
Part will argue lessened judicial scrutiny is appropriate for such
claims.
I. MEYER AND PIERCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR
PARENTS' FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DIRECT THEIR CHILDREN'S
UPBRINGING IN THE EDUCATION CONTEXT

From a constitutional standpoint, the discussion of hybrid rights
in the education context starts with Meyer v. Nebraska25 and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters.26 Both of these cases, decided prior to the modern
Supreme Court's creation of fundamental rights, 7 purported to
establish fundamental rights relating to a parent's ability to control
her child's education. There is some dispute over whether these
rights are fundamental in the sense that fundamental rights are
thought of today.28

Smith has commanded a majority of the United States Supreme Court to this point, and
this Comment will thus accept the legitimacy of this approach.
25. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
26. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
27. "[T]he Meyer and Pierce cases were decided well before the current 'right to
privacy' jurisprudence was developed, and the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether
the right to direct the upbringing and education of one's children is among those
fundamental rights whose infringement merits heightened scrutiny." Brown v. Hot, Sexy
& Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 1995).
28. See id. (questioning whether heightened scrutiny should be given to Pierce claims
since the Court decided that case prior to its modern due process jurisprudence).
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Meyer v. Nebraska

Robert Meyer taught at a parochial school run by the Zion
Evangelical Lutheran Congregation.29 On May 25, 1920, Meyer
conducted class by reading out of a textbook containing stories from

the Bible, a teaching method obviously not inappropriate for a
religious school.30 The text Meyer relied on, however, was in
German, and Meyer's class included a ten-year-old student who had
not yet completed the eighth grade.3' A Nebraska statute made it
illegal to conduct class in a language other than English to students
who had not yet completed the eighth grade.3 2

Meyer was convicted under this statute for teaching the student
in the German language before the child had graduated from eighth

grade.33 Meyer challenged the statute on numerous grounds,
including that the statute unreasonably intruded on the liberty
promised to him under the Fourteenth Amendment.34 On review, the

Nebraska Supreme Court upheld Meyer's conviction under the
statute, holding that the statute was a valid exercise of the State's
traditional police powers.35 This court found it a reasonable goal of
29. Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. 100, 101 (Neb. 1922). The United States Supreme Court
opinion in this case provides few specific details regarding the facts of this case, so the
Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in this case will be relied on for the facts.
30. Id.
31. Id. Meyer had good reason for conducting class in German: the parents of many
children at Meyer's school had only a basic understanding of English. The school
conducted class in German so that parents and children could communicate about the
religious ideas the children learned at school. See id.
32. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397 (1923).
33. Id. at 396-97.
34. Id. at 399.
35. See id. at 397. The lower court also based its opinion on xenophobic grounds that
are shocking to modern ears. The court noted that
[t]he salutary purpose of the statute is clear. The legislature had seen the baneful
effects of permitting foreigners, who had taken residence in this country, to rear
and educate their children in the language of their native land. The result of that
condition was found to be inimical to our own safety. To allow the children of
foreigners, who had emigrated here, to be taught from early childhood the
language of the country of their parents was to rear them with that language as
their mother tongue. It was to educate them so that they must always think in that
language, and, as a consequence, naturally inculcate in them the ideas and
sentiments foreign to the best interests of this country. The statute, therefore, was
intended not only to require that the education of all children be conducted in the
English language, but that, until they had grown into that language and until it had
become a part of them, they should not in the schools be taught any other
language. The obvious purpose of this statute was that the English language
should be and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this state. The
enactment of such a statute comes reasonably within the police power of the state.
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the State to ensure that the children of new immigrants became
acclimated to their new society by being required in school to think
and learn in their new language.36
The Supreme Court held that the statute unreasonably infringed
upon the liberty guaranteed to Meyer by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court, using the language of substantive due
process for one of the first times, noted that the term "liberty" in the
Fourteenth Amendment includes more than just freedom from bodily
restraints.37 To the Meyer Court, liberty also included
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.38
The Court went on to note that liberty interests could not be
overridden if the statute is "without reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the State to effect."3 9 This
language is the equivalent of rational basis.4" The Court's use of this
language is instructive in determining how the Court approached
fundamental rights in this era.
The Court concluded that the Nebraska statute unreasonably
interfered with Meyer's right to teach.4" More importantly for the
purposes of this Comment, the Court held that the statute
unreasonably interfered with "the right of parents to engage him so to
instruct their children," a right which the Court found to be within the
scope of Fourteenth Amendment liberty.4"

Id. at 397-98 (quoting Meyer, 187 N.W. at 102).
36. See Meyer, 187 N.W. at 101-02.
37. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
38. Id.

39. Id. at 399-400.
40. It is only appropriate to call the Court's analysis of the issue the "equivalent" of
rational basis because the Court had not yet adopted its tiered system for evaluating
rights. See Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 289 n.21 (5th Cir. 2001).
Thus, the Court in Pierce was obviously not engaging in rational basis review, because
rational basis review as it is thought of today did not yet exist.
41. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400, 402-03. Although the Court is not clear on the basis of its
opinion, this decision could be seen as advancing the right to choose a profession, listed
earlier in Meyer as within the scope of Fourteenth Amendment liberty. See id. at 399.
42. Id. at 400, 403.
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Pierce v. Society of Sisters

The statute at issue in Pierce required all parents in Oregon to
send their children aged eight to sixteen to a public school; failure to
do so was a misdemeanor offense. 3 The practical effect of this law
made operating a private school in Oregon extremely difficult.' The
Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, who ran
a private Catholic school, challenged the statute, arguing that it
interfered "with the right of parents to choose schools where their
children will receive appropriate mental and religious training, the
right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a school, [and] the
right of schools and teachers therein to engage in a useful business or
profession."45 A federal district court found that "the state ...
exceeded the limitations of its power-its purpose being to take
utterly away from complainants their constitutional right and
privilege to teach in the grammar grades-and has and will deprive
them of their property without due process of law."46 Oregon
appealed the district court's decision to the United States Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the State
had broad discretion over educational matters:
No question is raised concerning the power of the State
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and
examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all
children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall
be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that
certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be
taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical
to the public welfare.47
Given the Court's use of the rational basis doctrine in evaluating the
statute,48 this passage could be interpreted as allowing states to adopt
43. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530 (1925).
44. Id. at 531. This impediment to the operation of private schools was by design.
While the statute in Meyer was motivated by xenophobia, anti-Catholic sentiment
motivated the statute in Pierce. See Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools:
Reflections on Pierce, 70 Years Later, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1194, 1203 (1997); Garnett,

supra note 15, at 122-24. See generally David B. Tyack, The Perils of Pluralism: The
Background of the Pierce Case, 74 AM. HIST. REV. 74 (1968) (describing the historical
background behind Pierce in detail).
45. Pierce,268 U.S. at 532.
46. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary v. Pierce, 296 F. 928, 938
(D. Or. 1924).
47. Pierce,268 U.S. at 534.
48. Id. at 534-35.
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any reasonable regulations related to education. The Court, however,
found the Oregon statute was not within the bounds of
reasonableness, holding that it "unreasonably interferes with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control."49
Commentators often describe the result in Pierce as the "Pierce
Compromise."5
Under this compromise, "the state may compel
attendance at some school, but it is the parents' right to choose
between public and private schools."5 Despite many claims that the
case creates a broad parental right to direct children's upbringing,
Pierce by its own terms establishes a fairly limited right: parents have
the right to choose whether their children attend public or private
school.5 " It is true that Pierce itself uses the broad language of a right
to direct children's upbringing,5 3 and this is likely the root of some of
the confusion on this issue. A closer inspection of Pierce itself,
however, reveals that the Court did not intend for this case to
establish an unbridled, general right of parents to direct their
children's upbringing, as the next Section will explain.54
C.

The Impact of Meyer and Pierce
As noted above, the Court in Pierce emphasized that a state has
the authority to "reasonably ...regulate all schools," public and
private. Included in this authority is the ability
to inspect, supervise and examine [schools], their teachers and
pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 15 (4th
ed. 2002). Perhaps the Court's awareness of the discriminatory motivations explains the
aberrational outcomes (at least for the times) in those cases. See Carter, supra note 44, at
1203 ("[Pierce] must be understood in a historical context in which the Justices knew as
well as anybody that the Oregon law was, in large part, an effort to destroy Roman
Catholicism."); see also William G. Ross, The Contemporary Significance of Meyer and
Pierce for Parental Rights Issues Involving Education, 34 AKRON L. REV. 177, 179 (2000)
(noting that soon after Pierce, the Supreme Court stopped using substantive due process
to address personal liberties issues).
51. YUDOF, supra note 50, at 14.
52. Cf.Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 699 (10th Cir.
1998) (recognizing the existence of a constitutional parental right to direct children's
education, but noting that "[n]umerous cases... have made it clear that this constitutional
right is limited in scope").
53. Pierce,268 U.S. at 534-35 ("Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska ...we think
it entirely plain that the Act ... unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.").
54. See discussion infra Part I.C.
55. Pierce,268 U.S. at 534.
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school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and

patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to
good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught
which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.56

The state is given exclusive domain in these areas, all of which affect
the upbringing of children. The scope of the parental right created in
Pierce was not so broad as to touch on these areas, implying that the
Court did not intend the Pierce right to give parents unbridled
discretion over all decisions related to their children's education.
Furthermore, as in Meyer, the Court in Pierce used the language

of rational basis, holding that the statute at issue "unreasonably
interfere[d]" with the parents' liberty. 7 In this regard, Meyer and
Pierce are distinct from cases dealing with other fundamental rights,

which generally are treated with strict scrutiny. 8 The fact that Pierce
and Meyer received rational basis review should not be surprising:

the Supreme Court decided these cases before the Court developed
its current system of applying different levels of scrutiny.5 9 Justice

Harlan first suggested the concept of applying strict scrutiny to
fundamental rights in 1961,60 and a majority of the Supreme Court did
not embrace the concept until 1971.61

The Court's use of rational basis review provides further support
for the notion that Pierce did not establish a broad general parental
right to direct a child's upbringing. Under rational basis review, the
56. Id.
57. Id. at 534-35. Lower courts have similarly agreed that Pierce is couched in the
language of rational basis. See, e.g., Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ.,
89 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Meyer, Pierce, and Tokushige all use the language of
rational relationship review.").
58. Meyer and Pierce were both decided in the 1920s, decades before the Court
started routinely finding implied substantive rights within the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause; indeed, the cases were decided before the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525, 533 n.5 (1st Cir. 1995).
59. See id. at 533 (noting that "the opinions [in Meyer and Pierce] indicate that
something less than the current 'compelling state interest' test was then used to evaluate a
substantive due process challenge involving one of the listed liberty interests").
Conversely, under the Court's current approach, a court reviews fundamental rights under
strict scrutiny. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that fundamental rights receive strict scrutiny); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973) ("Only where state action impinges on the
exercise of fundamental constitutional rights or liberties must it be found to have chosen
the least restrictive alternative.").
60. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("This
enactment involves what ... must be granted to be a most fundamental aspect of 'liberty,'
the privacy of the home in its most basic sense, and it is this which requires that the statute
be subjected to 'strict scrutiny.' " (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
61. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971).
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state is able to override the interests of citizens provided that it acts in
a rational manner in furtherance of a legitimate state interest.6 2
Courts are very deferential to the state when applying rational basis
review,63 making it difficult for individual claimants to succeed.' A
right that yields to the state any time the state can justify its action as
furthering a legitimate interest is not broad in scope.
Most lower federal courts addressing the standard of judicial
scrutiny for Pierce claims have agreed that rational basis review is the
appropriate level of scrutiny.66 The Supreme Court's decision in
Troxel v. Granville,67 however, threw this almost universal acceptance
of the notion that Pierce claims receive rational basis review into
momentary disarray. In Troxel, a plurality of the Supreme Court,
relying on Pierce and Meyer,6 held that "the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents
to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children. '69 Although the Court did recognize a broad parental right,
62. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (explaining
basic rational basis review in the context of equal protection).
63. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) ("State legislatures
are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in
practice, their laws result in some inequality.").
64. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

652 (2d ed. 2002).
65. States are generally able to produce innumerable reasons for justifying a
legitimate interest. See, e.g., Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 453 F.3d 1010, 1015 (8th
Cir. 2006) (holding that a residency requirement for sex offenders rationally advanced the
legitimate interest of shielding children from sexual predators); People v. Williams, 811
N.E.2d 1197, 1198 (I11.
App. Ct.2004) (upholding Illinois's criminal prostitution statute in
the face of a due process challenge because the statute protects legitimate interests in
"protecting the safety, health, and welfare of the people"); State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726,
742-45 (Utah 2006) (upholding Utah's polygamy statute in the face of a due process
challenge, while noting the interest a state has in regulating marriage).
66. See, e.g., Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 290-91 (5th Cir,
2001) (noting that Pierce employed "the equivalent of a rational-basis test" and that this
analysis survived Troxel); Ohio Ass'n of Indep. Sch. v. Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 423 (6th Cir.
1996) (noting that "rational basis review, not strict scrutiny," governs the court's review in
a parent's challenge to state-mandated testing in private schools); Herndon v. Chapel HillCarrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 179 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that the Supreme
Court uses the "language of rational basis scrutiny" when discussing the parental Pierce
right); Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 462 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that
rational basis review applies to pure Pierce claims); cf. Brown v. Hot, Sexy, & Safer Prods.,
Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that the Supreme Court in Meyer and Pierce
did not clarify which level of judicial scrutiny applied). But see Hooks v. Clark County
Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1036, 1043 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Nothing here is meant to suggest that
the Pierceparental right warrants only rational-basis review.").
67. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
68. Id. at 65.
69. Id. at 66.
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it did not define the scope of this right.70 The Court did, however,
find that the Pierce parental right was broad enough to deem the
statute unconstitutional as applied in Troxel because it allowed

grandparents to receive visitation with their grandchildren over the
objection of a parent.7' It is unclear whether this holding signaled a
turn towards increasing the scope of the Pierce right generally. The

Court was cautious in its approach to Pierce, noting that "[t]he
constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation turns on the
specific manner in which that standard is applied and that the

constitutional protections in this area are best elaborated with care"72
and that "at least some special weight [is given] to the parent's own
determination,"7 3 rather than the substantial weight given to most

fundamental rights.
At least one commentator has interpreted Troxel as a signal from
the Supreme Court that heightened scrutiny should be applied to the
parental Pierce right.74
The Court did deem the right
"fundamental,"75 and strict scrutiny is often the appropriate analysis
for fundamental rights.76 There is reason to pause, however, before
jumping to the conclusion that this usual logic applies to the result in
Troxel.

70. See id. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring) ("Our cases... have not set out exact metes
and bounds to the protected interest of a parent in the relationship with his child."); see id.
at 95-96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that "in broad formulation" the Pierce right
exists, but "courts must use considerable restraint, including careful adherence to the
incremental instruction given by the precise facts of particular cases, as they seek to give
further and more precise definition to the right").
71. Id. at 68-69 (plurality opinion).
72. Id. at 73.
73. Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
74. See Heather M. Good, Comment, "The Forgotten Child of Our Constitution": The
ParentalFree Exercise Right to Direct the Education and Religious Upbringingof Children,
54 EMORY L.J. 641, 659 (2005) (claiming that Troxel establishes that at least intermediate
scrutiny applies to Pierceclaims).
75. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
76. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) ("[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment 'forbids the government to infringe... "fundamental" liberty interests at all,
no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.'") (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). Of
course, not all rights are "fundamental." In order for a right to qualify as "fundamental,"
it must be one that is" 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' " Id. (quoting
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). If a right is not one deeply
rooted in our national history and tradition, then it only qualifies for rational basis. See
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[O]nly fundamental
rights which are ' "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" ' qualify for
anything other than rational basis scrutiny under the doctrine of 'substantive due
process.' "(quoting Glucksberg,521 U.S. at 721)).
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First of all, only a plurality of the Court joined the decision in
Troxel.77 As such, it does not have the same precedential value that a

majority opinion would carry.78 Of course, Troxel is a Supreme Court
opinion, and the process of counting the Justices' votes throughout
the various opinions may provide an indication of where the Court is
heading in this area. The plurality of four,79 Justice Souter, ° Justice
Thomas," and Justice Kennedy 2 all show some support for the Pierce
right in Troxel.
The significance of this large percentage of the Court recognizing
the right in separate opinions is diminished by the fact that only
Justice Thomas, who concurred in the judgment, actually articulated
what level of judicial scrutiny he would apply to Pierce claims.8 3
Justice Thomas revealed in his concurring opinion, which no other
Justice joined, that he would apply strict scrutiny review to Pierce
claims.' The other Justices were well aware of the historical tradition
of applying rational basis to Pierce claims.85 Their silence on this issue
is telling, especially in light of Justice Thomas's choice to raise the
issue explicitly in his concurring opinion.86 Justice Thomas found it
"curiou[s]" that although the plurality opinion, Justice Souter in his
separate opinion, and Justice Kennedy in his separate opinion
77. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer
joined the plurality opinion in Troxel. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
78. See Tanner Adver. Group v. Fayette County, 451 F.3d 777, 794 (11th Cir. 2006)
(Birch, J., concurring) (noting that fractured plurality Supreme Court opinions can hold
"dubious precedential value"); Jones v. City of L.A., 444 F.3d 1118, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006)
(noting that Supreme Court plurality opinions are limited to their exact facts unless a
Justice from the minority joins the plurality on a given legal point); see also Linda Novak,
Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Opinions, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
756, 756 (1980) (noting the difficulty lower federal courts have in interpreting Supreme
Court plurality opinions).
79. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
80. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring) (recognizing "that a parent's
interests in the nurture, upbringing, companionship, care, and custody of children are
generally protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
81. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I would apply strict scrutiny to infringements
of fundamental rights.... Washington lacks even a legitimate governmental interest.. . in
second-guessing a fit parent's decision regarding visitation with third parties.").
82. See supra note 70.
83. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The opinions of the plurality,
Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter recognize ... a right [to direct children's upbringing],
but curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of review.").
84. See id. ("Our decision in Pierce ... holds that parents have a fundamental
constitutional right to rear their children, including the right to determine who shall
educate and socialize them ....
I would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of
fundamental rights.").
85. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
86. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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recognized a right to raise children, "none of them articulates the
appropriate standard of review."87 Obviously this is not an issue that
the Justices simply overlooked; it was explicitly raised by one of their
colleagues, and they chose to ignore it.88
Only one federal circuit court has explicitly addressed the
appropriate judicial scrutiny for Pierce claims after Troxel, and that
court applied rational basis review.8 9
In Littlefield v. Forney
9" the Fifth Circuit noted that parental
Independent School District,
rights traditionally fail in the face of reasonable regulation in the
public school context.9 The court in Littlefield found nothing in
Troxel to change the judicial scrutiny given to Pierce claims.9 2 The
Littlefield court's analysis of this issue is admittedly limited. It did
note, however, that the Supreme Court in Troxel did not precisely
define the scope of the right discussed93 and failed to articulate a
standard of judicial scrutiny for Pierce claims.94
In summary, most federal courts agree that rational basis is
applied to pure Pierce claims based on parental challenges of public
education practices. This fact would have broad implications for the
hypothetical parents seeking to have their school board include
intelligent design in the curriculum.
Their Pierce claim is
multifaceted: they want intelligent design to be added for religious
reasons so their children can engage in independent critical thinking.
If the trial court focuses solely on the Pierce claim, it will apply
rational basis review and uphold the school board's decision if it
rationally advances a legitimate state interest. The purpose of the
school board's decision is to provide a scientifically accurate
curriculum. The court could conclude that the decision to keep
intelligent design out of the curriculum furthers this goal, given the

87. Id.
88. Indeed, the Court's treatment of Pierce in Troxel has led one scholar to announce
that the Justices only "sort of" affirmed Pierce: "Pierce was 'sort of' re-affirmed in Troxel
because the Court did not appear to apply, nor did it give any indication that it would
apply in the future, the kind of strict scrutiny that laws touching 'fundamental' rights are
usually thought to require." Garnett, supra note 15, at 126 n.79.
89. See Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 291 (5th Cir. 2001)
("Troxel does not change the [practice of applying rational basis review to Pierce claims]
in the context of parental rights concerning public education.").
90. 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001).
91. See id. at 291.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 289 n.20.
94. See id. at 289.

HYBRID RIGHTS

2006]

questionable scientific evidence backing the theory." Thus, the
hypothetical parents are likely to lose if they rely solely on their
Pierce claim.
II. EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V. SMITH: LOWER JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
IN PURE FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS

The hypothetical parents' second claim would be based on the
First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion.96 The
Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith9 7
First
Amendment
free
exercise
fundamentally
changed
jurisprudence.98 To understand how revolutionary Smith was in the
free exercise arena, a basic understanding of previous free exercise

jurisprudence is necessary. Prior to Smith, the Supreme Court's free
exercise jurisprudence had been marked by granting exemptions to
generally applicable laws under the compelling interest test.99 Under
this test, the Court asked "whether government has placed a
substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or
practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest

100
justifies the burden."

Analyzing a case that used the compelling interest test will help
contrast the protection given to free exercise under that test and the
Court's new free exercise test adopted in Smith. Wisconsin v. Yoder'
provides an appropriate model, since that case, like the recurring
hypothetical, involved elements of both free exercise and parental
rights 0 2
95. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting that there are potential scientific
flaws in the theory of intelligent design).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.").
97. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
98. One commentator even went so far as to say that "[s]ince [Smith] we have had a
new Free Exercise Clause." James D. Gordon 1II, The New Free Exercise Clause, 26 CAP.
U. L. REV. 65, 65 (1997).
99. See, e.g., Frazee v. I11.Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989)
(granting unemployment benefits to a man who, for religious reasons, had declined to take
a job requiring him to work on Sundays).
100. Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
101. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
102. Although Yoder does involve parental rights, the Court did not resolve the case
on those grounds. See id. at 215-16. As Professor McConnell notes, the result in Yoder
(allowing the Amish parents to keep their children out of school) is based solely on free
exercise grounds, despite the case being characterized as a "hybrid situation" in Smith.
See McConnell, supra note 24, at 1121-22; cf. James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the
Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91, 98 (1991) ("[I]n Yoder the Court expressly stated that it
granted certiorari to review the free exercise claim, and its opinion discussed that legal
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Wisconsin v. Yoder and the Compelling Interest Test

In Yoder, a Wisconsin statute compelled all students to attend
either private or public school until age sixteen. 3 Jonas Yoder and
Wallace Miller, adherents of the Amish faith, objected to sending
their children to school past the eighth grade," explaining that, under
the Amish faith, attendance at high school endangered the salvation
of both parents and children." 5 In order to prevail under the
compelling interest test, the Amish parents had to prove they had a

religious interest, 10 6 that their religious interest was sincere,' 0 7 and that
this religious interest was substantially burdened by the State's
action.0 8 If the Amish parents established these elements, Wisconsin
could still override their interest if "a state interest of sufficient
magnitude" exists."0 9
The State conceded that the Amish professed a religious interest

that was sincere. 1"'

The Court also found that the Amish parents'

faith would be substantially burdened if their children were required

to attend high school, stressing that the parents' views on this subject
were not the product of "personal preference," but rather were the
result of a "religious conviction" that had developed over a rich 300

issue most."). Ironically, although Yoder mentioned Pierce and the combination of two
constitutional claims, in that case the Court recognized that the stronger, viable claim was
rooted in free exercise. The Court noted in Yoder that "when the interests of parenthood
are combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than
merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State' is
required to sustain the validity of the State's requirement under the First Amendment."
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233. This statement recognizes the weakness of the Pierce claim;
according to the Yoder Court, such a Pierceclaim would only be given scrutiny higher than
rational basis (and thus likely have more of a chance to succeed) when it merged with a
viable (pre-Smith) free exercise claim. Id. Thus, the logic of Smith's hybrid rights
doctrine, which used Yoder for support, is turned on its head.
103. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
104. Id. at 207-09.
105. Id. at 209. The Amish parents produced significant evidence to this effect at trial.
See id. at 209-13. One of their experts concluded that requiring Amish children to attend
high school could "ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church
community as it exists in the United States today." Id. at 212.
106. See id. at 215-16 (noting that a religious belief, and not merely a "way of life,"
merits the protection of the Freedom of Religion Clause).
107. See id. at 209 (noting that the State conceded that the respondents' religious
beliefs were sincere).
108. See id. at 219 (noting that "enforcement of the State's requirement of compulsory
formal education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free
exercise of respondents' religious beliefs").
109. Id. at 214.
110. Id. at 209.
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year history. 1 Thus, the Amish parents met their burden of proof
under the compelling interest test.
Wisconsin's statute would survive, however, if the State could
show an interest so compelling that it was necessary to override the
religious claim." 2 The State produced two interests which it believed
were sufficiently important to override the religious interests of the
Amish parents. 3 The first interest was "that some degree of
education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively
and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve
freedom and independence." ' 4 The Court agreed that this interest
was important, but it did not find it sufficient to override the parents'
religious interests in this case.1 5 The Court questioned the value of
an additional two years of formal education to prepare Amish
children for modern life, noting that the Amish live in isolated
agrarian communities." 6 The Court applied the same logic to the
State's second stated interest of "prepar[ing] individuals to be selfreliant and self-sufficient participants in society.""' 7 The Court
further pointed out that the traditional values taught by the Amish
faith-values in which Amish children would be immersed in lieu of
high school-did not preclude success for any Amish child who
decided to veer out into modern society." 8 As a result, the State's
power to compel parents to send their children to school for half the
day succumbed to the religious views of a few individuals." 9
The compelling interest test may be a misnomer; 20 indeed, it is
arguable that perhaps the Court has never truly employed a pure
compelling interest test in the free exercise arena. 21 For instance,
with regard to intentional racial discrimination, another area of law
utilizing a compelling interest test, the Court has rarely found any
22
government interest compelling enough to rule in favor of the state.
111. See id. at 216-19.
112. Id. at 221.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 221-22.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 221.
118. Id. at 224-25.
119. Id. at 234. One commentator described Yoder as "the high water mark of
religious liberty under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment." James D.
Gordon III, Wisconsin v. Yoder and Religious Liberty, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1237, 1237 (1996).
120. See McConnell, supra note 24, at 1127.
121. See id.
122. Id. There is one situation in the area of intentional racial discrimination that the
Court has found a compelling interest: affirmative action admissions programs in

404
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On the other hand, the Court has found some state interests
compelling enough in free exercise cases to trump a religious litigant's
claim.'23 Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the Court engaged in
some form of heightened scrutiny on occasion under the compelling
interest test, 24 and that this level of scrutiny was higher than "the
toothless rationality review" adopted in Smith."'
B.

Employment Division v. Smith
In Smith, two Native Americans, Alfred Smith and Galen Black,

were fired from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation center after
they consumed peyote during a religious ceremony for the Native
American Church. 26 Peyote is a controlled substance that causes
hallucinations, 12 and its use is banned by statute in Oregon unless
prescribed by a medical practitioner. 128 The two men's applications

for

unemployment

discharges were

due

compensation

were

to "work-related

denied because
'
misconduct."129

their
After

prolonged litigation, 3 ° the Oregon Supreme Court, utilizing a form of
the compelling interest test,13 ' held that the State's peyote statute was
invalid under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause as applied
32
to Smith and Black.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Oregon Supreme

Court, holding that because the statute was valid, neutral, and
graduate schools. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). Of course, benign
affirmative action programs are distinguishable from the type of invidious intentional
discrimination the Court normally guards against. As the Court noted in Grutter,
"[cjontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental action." See id. at 327. Thus,
the overall point that the Court rarely upholds government action with regard to
intentional racial discrimination but has frequently upheld disparate governmental impact
on religion under the compelling interest test is valid even after Grutter.
123. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986) (holding that the Free
Exercise Clause did not require the Air Force to allow an Orthodox Jew to wear a
yarmulke in violation of uniform dress regulations); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
258-59 (1982) (finding a compelling government interest in the efficient operation of the
Social Security system).
124. See McConnell, supra note 24, at 1128. Yoder is a good example of the Court
engaging in heightened scrutiny. See supra notes 103-19 and accompanying text.
125. McConnell, supra note 24, at 1128.
126. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. The Smith litigation has an unusual and interesting history in itself. For a
description of the twists and turns in the Smith litigation, which lasted over five years, see
McConnell, supra note 24, at 1111-14.
131. See Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445,449-51 (Or. 1986).
132. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876.
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generally applicable, it did not violate Smith's and Black's free
exercise rights. 33 The Court explained that "the right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).' "34 The facts of Smith aptly illustrate the application of
this new rule. The statute at issue in that case135 was certainly valid;
there is nothing in Smith to indicate it was not passed in the same
fashion as all other statutes that were passed in Oregon. The statute
at issue in Smith was neutral; even Smith and Black admitted that
Oregon did not single out the religious practices of the Native
American Church when adopting its statute.'36 Finally, the statute at
issue in Smith was generally applicable. All citizens of Oregon
without prescriptions were required to conform to the State's ban on
controlled substances.'37 Thus, under the Smith analysis, Oregon had
not violated Smith's and Black's free exercise rights.'38
With this holding in Smith, the Supreme Court created a new test
to evaluate free exercise claims.'39 Under this test, statutes withstand
133. Id. at 879.
134. Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)). In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the rule announced in
Smith was merely a continuation of the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence. See
id. This contention has been flatly rejected by the majority of commentators addressing
the issue. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 102, at 91-92 (containing a dialogue between a
hypothetical student and his spiritual teacher explaining that although an entire book may
have been necessary to explain the free exercise claim before Smith, after Smith "a
pamphlet would suffice"). At least one commentator who agrees with the result in Smith
has said that the opinion itself is indefensible. See Marshall, supra note 24, at 308-09
(stating that "[t]he Smith opinion itself ... cannot be readily defended" and defining his
role as "defend[ing] Smith's rejection of constitutionally compelled free exercise
exemptions without defending Smith itself").
135. See OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992 (1987) (current version at § 475.840 (2006)).
136. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
137. See id. Justice Scalia notes in his opinion that the State always had the option of
creating exemptions for certain classes from generally applicable laws, thus bypassing any
need for constitutional analysis. See id. at 890.
138. See id. at 890.
139. The Court's holding in Smith was a marked departure from prior free exercise
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 531 (1993) ("In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of
religion, our cases establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of
general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if
the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice."); Smith, 494
U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In my view, today's holding dramatically departs
from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence ... and is incompatible with our
Nation's fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty."); id. at 908 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) ("Until today, I thought [the compelling interest test] was a settled and
inviolate principle of this Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. The majority,
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a free exercise challenge if they are valid, neutral, and generally

applicable. 4 '

This new test creates a strong presumption that a

government action unintentionally affecting religion is valid.' 4' Smith

signaled that the days of the compelling interest test in which the state

however, perfunctorily dismisses it as a 'constitutional anomaly.' "); Steven H. Aden and
Lee J.Strang, When a "Rule" Doesn't Rule: The Failure of the Oregon Employment
Division v. Smith "Hybrid Rights Exception," 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 573, 579 (2003)
(arguing Smith "unsettled settled law and announced a new rule of free exercise
jurisprudence"); Gordon, supra note 98, at 65 ("Since [the Smith decision in] 1990 we have
had a new Free Exercise Clause."); McConnell, supra note 24, at 1109-11 (noting that
Smith drastically changed free exercise jurisprudence, which was previously "stable");
Bertrand Fry, Note, Breeding ConstitutionalDoctrine: The Provenanceand Progeny of the
"Hybrid Situation" in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence,71 TEX. L. REV. 833, 834
(1993) (noting Smith "handed practitioners and scholars an entirely new system of analysis
for free exercise claims").
140. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
141. One commentator described the test in Smith as "a categorical rule applying
rational basis." Good, supra note 74, at 654. The test in Smith is similar but distinct from
the rational basis test. Under the rational basis test, the State must show that it has drawn
a classification that is "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam). This is an incredible hurdle for litigants
challenging the state to overcome. Cf.Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 855 (1994) (lamenting the Supreme Court's
reasonableness standard for the Fourth Amendment, which she views as similar to rational
basis review, and deeming it "a level of scrutiny that has proven to be effectively no
scrutiny at all"). Although the situations are rare, there have been occasions where the
Supreme Court has employed a rational basis test and still found that the state's means are
not related to any legitimate state interests. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(holding an amendment to state constitution aiming to disadvantage homosexuals
unconstitutional because a "desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute
a legitimate governmental interest" (quoting U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534 (1973))); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448-49 (1985) (finding
that city's multiple reasons for denying a permit to establish a group home for the
mentally retarded either not based on legitimate purposes or not using rational means to
advance a legitimate state goal); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-64 (1982) (holding that
Alaska's distribution of State money based on length of State residency did not advance a
legitimate State interest); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 528 (preventing "hippies" from
participating in food stamp program held not to advance a legitimate purpose). On the
other hand, all government action establishing neutral, generally applicable laws is valid
despite its effect on religion. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)). Government action is only invalid if it
singles out a given religion. See, e.g., City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533-34 (holding that an
ordinance regulating animal sacrifice was not neutral because it singled out the Santeria
religion). While both tests are extremely deferential to the state, their focus is distinct:
the Smith test asks if a regulation was created with the intent to disadvantage a religion
(otherwise it is likely valid as neutral and generally applicable), while the rational basis
test asks if the regulation adopted by the state is related to a legitimate state goal.
Admittedly, these tests can overlap (as in Romer, where the State's intentional singling out
of homosexuals was held invalid), but they are conceptually distinct.
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highest of justifications were over
had to validate its actions with the
142
in the normal free exercise case.
C. Impact of Smith on Pure Free Exercise Claims
The parents from the intelligent design hypothetical would
receive a result similar to Smith if its claim relied on a free exercise
theory alone. Again, the state action at issue in this situation is the
school board's decision not to add intelligent design to the
curriculum. Under Smith, the hypothetical reviewing court would
uphold the school board's decision if the regulation were valid,
neutral, and generally applicable.
The hypothetical assumes that the school board, being the entity
in the hypothetical jurisdiction charged with adopting the curriculum,
has acted validly in regulating the curriculum. Furthermore, the
school board's decision is generally applicable: no public school
children in the school district will be taught about intelligent design
theory. No group of students will be singled out to learn about (or
not be taught) intelligent design. Finally, the school board's decision
is neutral. The school board's decision was not based on malevolence
against the parents personally or the religious basis of their beliefs.
The school board's decision not to include intelligent design in the
school system's curriculum was based on its judgment regarding the
scientific validity of the theory,14 ' a judgment that school boards
traditionally have the authority to exercise regarding curriculum.
Thus, the parents' free exercise claim, standing alone, would likely
fiil.

142. The Court was quite forceful in insisting that the compelling interest test was not
appropriate for most free exercise claims, noting that the compelling interest test "ha[s]
nothing to do with an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of
conduct" and that
[t]he government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially
harmful conduct... "cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental
action on a religious objector's spiritual development." To make an individual's
obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his
religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is "compelling"-permitting
him, by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law unto himself" ... contradicts both
constitutional tradition and common sense.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85 (citations omitted).
143. Cf. Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 932 (1991) (holding
that state regulations of public school testing and academic standing were neutral under
Smith).
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III. THE HYBRID RIGHTS SITUATION IN SMITH: HEIGHTENED
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY FOR SOME FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS?

As demonstrated by the analysis in the previous Part, resolution
the
hypothetical parents' intelligent design claim would be
of
relatively simple if analyzed solely under Pierce or solely under a
post-Smith free exercise analysis. The parents in both situations are
likely to lose. 1" The plurality in Smith, however, threw a curveball
into situations such as the one facing the hypothetical parents,
complicating the analysis. The Smith plurality named this curveball a
The Court first mentioned the "hybrid
"hybrid situation."'4 5
situation" in Smith, and it did so sua sponte.
Justice Scalia explained this "hybrid situation" by stating that
[t]he only decisions in which we have held that the First
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable
law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as
freedom of speech and of the press, or the right of parents,
acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters ...to direct the
education of their children. Some of our cases prohibiting
compelled expression, decided exclusively upon free speech
grounds, have also involved freedom of religion. And it is easy
to envision a case in which a challenge on freedom of
likewise be reinforced by Free
association grounds would
146
Exercise Clause concerns.
Under this hybrid rights doctrine, free exercise claims apparently
receive heightened scrutiny when brought in connection with another
constitutional claim. 4 ' Smith clearly states that the hybrid rights
144. See discussion supra Parts I.C., II.C.
145. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
146. Id. at 881-82 (citations omitted).
147. One can say that the hybrid rights doctrine only "apparently" gives heightened
scrutiny in these situations because the Supreme Court defined the boundaries of the
doctrine very imprecisely. See id. at 881-82; see also Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207
(9th Cir. 1999) (noting that the Supreme Court "has been somewhat less than precise with
regard to the nature of hybrid rights"). However, some United States courts of appeals
have interpreted the Court's discussion of hybrid rights to require heightened scrutiny.
For instance, the Ninth Circuit noted that "Smith ...excepts a hybrid-rights claim from its
rational basis test. In Smith, the Court distinguished the strict scrutiny imposed in 'hybrid
situation[s]' in which a law 'involve[s] not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections.' " Miller, 176 F.3d at
1207 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82); see also Intercommunity
Ctr. for Justice & Peace v. INS, 910 F.2d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that strict scrutiny
applies in hybrid situations).
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doctrine extends to Pierce claims. 148 The exact scope of the hybrid
rights doctrine, however, is unclear; Smith itself gives little guidance
on the breadth of the protection provided by the doctrine and even
less guidance on how these claims are to be evaluated by courts. The
Court's lack of guidance can be attributed to the fact that the hybrid
rights doctrine was not raised as an issue in the case,149 limiting the
Court's discussion of the issue to dicta.
Given the Court's scant attention to this newly created hybrid
rights doctrine, however, it should not be surprising that lower federal
courts have struggled with how to treat the hybrid rights doctrine and
whether it even exists. 5 ' Although the hybrid rights doctrine appears
to be simple on its face, federal courts have found it "difficult to
delineate the exact contours of the hybrid-rights theory" in
application. 5' The Ninth Circuit explained the confusion:
The Supreme Court has been somewhat less than precise with
regard to the nature of hybrid rights. Perhaps not surprisingly
in view of the Supreme Court's rather cryptic explanations, the
courts of appeals have struggled to decipher Smith's hybridrights formula and have reached divergent 1 conclusions
as to
52
exactly what constitutes a hybrid-rights claim.
These struggles in applying Smith's hybrid rights formula should not
be surprising. Since Smith was so unclear in formulating the doctrine
(and since other Supreme Court cases, such as Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,'53 have dodged the issue entirely),
one commentator predicted that "lower federal and state courts will
be relatively free to establish their own interpretations and analysis of
54
the hybrid exception.'

1

Courts are not alone in their bafflement at Smith; legal scholars
have found much to criticize about the decision. Two themes in the
148. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
149. Indeed, the parties could not have raised the issue because the hybrid rights
doctrine was created in Smith. Professor McConnell raises an interesting point that Smith
could be construed as a hybrid case itself. See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
The Court, however, ignored this possibility, and only discussed the hybrid rights doctrine
in dicta as a way of distinguishing prior free exercise cases from the result in Smith. See
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
150. See Jonathan B. Hensley, Comment, Approaches to the Hybrid-Rights Doctrine in
Free Exercise Cases, 68 TENN. L. REV. 119, 119 (2000).
151. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 699 (10th Cir. 1998).
152. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 703 (9th Cir. 1999),
reh'g granted,withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999).
153. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
154. Ren6e Skinner, Note, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah:
Still Sacrificing Free Exercise, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 259, 278 (1994).
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critical literature regarding Smith are especially relevant to this
Comment: the majority's questionable use of precedent and the
apparent illogic of the doctrine itself. The majority's questionable use
of precedent has drawn much criticism. In his majority opinion in
Smith, Justice Scalia seemingly makes the claim that Smith does not

break new ground and is consistent with prior free exercise
jurisprudence. According to Scalia, statutes that are valid, neutral,
and generally applicable have always prevailed in the face of free

exercise challenges, 55 and parties bringing free exercise challenges
have been successful only when their claims were "[brought] in
conjunction with,' 1 56 "connected with,"' 157 or "implicat[ing]"' 58
"constitutional protections.' ' 59 This interpretation of the Supreme

Court's free exercise jurisprudence can be described only as
misguided. Even Professor William P. Marshall, a defender of the

outcome of Smith (if not the means by which the case was decided),
described Smith's "use of precedent [as] border[ing] on fiction.""
The Court's characterization of Yoder as a hybrid claim is an
example of their questionable interpretation of precedent. In Smith,
the Court claimed that Yoder involved a hybrid claim merging a free
exercise claim with a Pierce parental right claim.16 ' The Court's use of
precedent in creating the hybrid rights doctrine has generally been

155. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-81 (1990). Scalia's contention on
this point is incorrect. Scholars such as Professor McConnell have persuasively argued
that Scalia's view of history was inaccurate and that Scalia knew this himself. McConnell
notes that fourteen months prior to his opinion in Smith, Scalia recognized that "the Court
had 'held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required religious beliefs
to be accommodated by granting religion-specific exemptions from otherwise applicable
laws.'" See McConnell, supra note 24, at 1121 (quoting Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1, 38 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Professor Gordon was more colorful in his
critique of Scalia's contention that Smith did not veer from prior free exercise
jurisprudence: "That statement is almost Orwellian; it is a manifestly false statement of
history." Gordon, supra note 102, at 97.
156. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
157. See id. at 882; see also Hicks v. Halifax County Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649,
661 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (listing cases holding that the hybrid rights doctrine applied when a
party brings a claim that is "connected with" or "connected to" another constitutional
right).
158. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997). This "implication"
language was first used by the Court in Flores when describing the hybrid rights doctrine
provided in Smith through the example provided in Yoder. It does not appear to clarify
(or substantively change) the scope of the hybrid rights doctrine.
159. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
160. Marshall, supra note 24, at 309. Professor Gordon, not a defender of the result in
Smith, describes the Court's use of precedent in that case as "clumsy revisionism."
Gordon, supra note 102, at 99.
161. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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criticized, but the Court's labeling of Yoder as a hybrid claim in
particular has received a great amount of criticism. 162 For instance,
one commentator noted that "[t]he Court's claim that Wisconsin v.
Yoder ... was decided on the basis of a 'hybrid' constitutional right
... is particularly illustrative of poetic license., 163 This claim is
especially troubling for the purposes of this Comment, since those are
the two rights on which this Comment focuses.
Scalia's characterization of Yoder as a hybrid claim is inaccurate.
While Yoder does address Pierce, as Justice Souter noted in another
4 Yoder principally cited
case, it raised Pierce only to distinguish it."&
Pierce to establish the fact that the state has the power to adopt
generally applicable statutes reasonably regulating education. 165 With
regard to the parental rights aspect of the "Pierce Compromise," the
Court in Yoder explicitly noted that its "holding in no way determines
the proper resolution of possible competing interests of parents,
children, and the State in an appropriate state court proceeding"
related to the issue in Yoder."6 The Court acknowledged that Pierce
would be relevant in determining that question, but stated that "[o]n
this record we neither reach nor decide those issues."' 67
Furthermore, despite Scalia's claim that Yoder was based on
both free exercise and Pierce rights, the Court in that case granted
certiorari to review the free exercise claim, and the Justices placed
most of their focus on that issue. 168 As Professor McConnell notes, it

162. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 24, at 309 n.3; McConnell, supra note 24, at 1120-22;
see also Gordon, supra note 102, at 99-100.
163. See Marshall, supra note 24, at 309 n.3 (citations omitted).
164. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566
n.4 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) ("Yoder. . . mentioned the parental rights recognized in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters ....
But Yoder did so only to distinguish Pierce .... " (citations
omitted)).
165. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214, 233 (1972). The Court in Yoder did
state that "when the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the
nature revealed by this record, more than merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the State' is required to sustain the validity of the State's
requirement under the First Amendment." See id. at 233. The higher standard the Yoder
Court was referring to, however, was not the hybrid rights doctrine (which did not yet
exist); instead, the Yoder Court was referring to the higher standard established earlier in
that opinion. See City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 566-67 n.4 (Souter, J., concurring). In other
words, the Yoder Court was stating that in situations like the one presented in Yoder, the
higher burden of free exercise applied rather than the lower standard of Pierce. See
Yoder, 406 U.S at 233. Of course, after Smith, free exercise no longer presents a
substantial burden for the state.
166. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 231.
167. Id. at 231-32.
168. See Gordon, supra note 102, at 98.
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is evident from Yoder that the Justices' focus was on free exercise. 169
The Yoder Court noted that the Amish would only have the
constitutional ability to defy the state's compulsory education law if
they based their objection to the law on religious reasons. 7 ° Thus,
according to McConnell, the Amish parents in Yoder "have no right
independent of the Free Exercise Clause to withhold their children
from school."''
The characterization of Yoder, a well-known and revered
Supreme Court precedent,' as being based equally on Pierce and
free exercise grounds, gives legitimacy to the notion that these hybrid
claims should be strengthened. This Comment argues that these
claims should be weakened; this misapplication of prior precedent
gives an unmerited trump card to parents merging Pierce claims to a
free exercise claim to challenge school policies.
Smith's fast and loose use of precedent in creating the hybrid
rights doctrine makes one wonder how much credence should be
given to the doctrine.173 As Professor McConnell notes, "[o]ne
suspects that the notion of 'hybrid' claims was created for the sole
'
purpose of distinguishing Yoder in [Smith]."174
Thus, it may be that
the Smith majority's declaration that free exercise claims merged with
Pierce claims should be given heightened scrutiny should not be taken
seriously."'
Another troubling aspect of Smith is the apparent illogic behind
the hybrid rights doctrine's rationale. Justice Souter discussed the
inconsistency inherent in the hybrid rights doctrine at length in an
opinion concurring with the judgment in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.7 6 Justice Souter noted that he was
"not persuaded" by the hybrid rights doctrine, arguing that it
essentially had no meaning:

169. See McConnell, supra note 24, at 1121.
170. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16.
171. See McConnell, supra note 24, at 1121.
172. See generally Gordon, supra note 119 (showing one author's feelings about
Yoder).
173. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit refuses to recognize the Supreme Court's opinion until
the Court further clarifies the doctrine. See Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5
F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (calling the hybrid rights doctrine "illogical" and refusing to
apply it until the Supreme Court clarifies the doctrine).
174. McConnell, supra note 24, at 1121.
175. See id. at 1122 (suggesting that "the Smith Court's notion of 'hybrid' claims was
not intended to be taken seriously").
176. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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[T]he distinction Smith draws strikes me as ultimately
untenable. If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another
constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception
would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule ....But
if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain
an exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable law
under another constitutional provision, then there would have
been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid
cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.177
Professor McConnell further elaborated on Justice Souter's point
by remarking that the hybrid rights doctrine could be construed so
broadly as to cover the facts of Smith itself.'7 8 McConnell argues that
Smith's and Black's use of peyote could be deemed an exercise of
their First Amendment free speech rights.'7 9 McConnell notes that
Smith and Black would likely lose on their free speech claim, but
under the hybrid rights doctrine, it would not matter since this claim
is linked with a free exercise claim. 8 ' The unclear status of the scope
of the hybrid doctrine raises the issue of what the doctrine is meant to
achieve, again recalling Professor McConnell's statement that "the
Smith Court's notion of 'hybrid' claims was not intended to be taken
seriously."''
If one constitutional right is insufficient on its own, there seems
little justification for strengthening that right when it happens to be
brought in conjunction with another constitutional right.
One
possible rationale for this doctrine is that when a strong claim is
merged with a free exercise claim, a court ruling in favor of a plaintiff
is really basing its decision on the basis of the strong claim. In other
words, the weaker claim is mere surplusage for the court's decision.
Indeed, this appears to be the motivation behind federal courts'
requirement of either colorable claims or independently viable
claims. The hybrid rights doctrine, however, becomes much more
troubling when it is used to merge two weak rights unlikely to win on
their own, such as the combination of Pierce rights and free exercise
rights at issue in this Comment. In this situation, a court cannot rule
in a plaintiff's favor by falling back on the strength of the other claim.
The hybrid rights doctrine indeed allows two weak claims that
would not be sufficient on their own accord to join together and
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring).
See McConnell, supra note 24, at 1122.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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become a single sufficient constitutional claim. 82
As one
commentator bluntly summarized the doctrine: "[p]ut simply, two
losers equals one winner."' 83 But this result does not make sense on
its face. The Supreme Court in Smith did not provide a rationale for
why a claim that is clearly insufficient on its own suddenly becomes
sufficient when merged with another insufficient claim."8
Despite significant scholarly criticism of Smith's hybrid rights
doctrine, at least some federal courts have held that a heightened
level of scrutiny applies to hybrid rights situations.' 85 Assume that
this is the case in the jurisdiction in which the hypothetical parents are
bringing their claim. The parents would bring both a free exercise
claim and a Pierce claim. This action would qualify as a hybrid claim
under Smith, being a "[f]ree [e]xercise [claim brought] in conjunction
with other constitutional protections.11 86 If this hybrid claim triggers
a compelling interest test similar to the one applied in Yoder,'87 the
parents' claim would have a much better chance of success than if
either of their two claims were brought separately. 188 The parents
would be able to show that they had a sincere religious interest.
Given the right evidentiary background, the parents might also be
able to show that the school board's regulation substantially

182. See Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants To Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights
Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 430-31
(1994).

183. See William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free
Exercise Plus or ConstitutionalSmoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211, 219 (1998);
see also Rodney A. Smolla, The Free Exercise of Religion After the Fall: The Case for
Intermediate Scrutiny, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925, 930 (1998) (describing this situation
as confining the Constitution to "two-for-one sales").
184. Esser, finding it unsatisfactory that two losers could combine to become winners,
advances what he calls the "subterfuge interpretation." See Esser, supra note 183, at 219.
Esser theorizes that the Court created the hybrid rights doctrine merely as a way to "hide"
precedent that it found inconvenient to its desired result in Smith. See id.; cf McConnell,
supra note 24, at 1122 (hypothesizing that perhaps the Smith Court never intended for the
hybrid rights doctrine to be taken seriously).
185. See, e.g., Krafchow v. Town of Woodstock, 62 F. Supp. 2d 698, 712 (N.D.N.Y.
1999) ("The implication of the [Smith] Court's distinction is that in ... 'hybrid' cases,
courts should apply the more exacting standard of review set forth in Sherbert v. Verner
186. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,881 (1990).
187. Some courts evaluating hybrid claims that merge these two particular rights have
applied a test similar to that used in Yoder to the hybrid rights claim. See, e.g., Hicks v.
Halifax County Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 662-63 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (applying strict
scrutiny to parents' hybrid claim challenging school's uniform policy because the claim
combined the same rights at issue in Yoder). The hypothetical parents bring these same
two claims, so Yoder should apply.
188. See discussion supra Parts I.C., II.C.
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burdened their religion.189 The school board would certainly be able
to cite some compelling state interests justifying their action, such as
the need to have a consistent curriculum across their school district
and the necessity of only promoting proven scientific concepts in their
classrooms. A court reviewing this claim would ultimately have to
balance the interests of the two parties, much like the Supreme Court
did in Yoder. Although the parents' claim under this test is by no
means a clear winner, 9 ' it is also by no means a clear loser. That is an
improvement for them over the success they would have if they
brought their claims individually, 9 ' despite the fact that the substance
of their two claims is virtually the same.
IV.

HYBRID CLAIMS MERGING FREE EXERCISE WITH PIERCE

RIGHTS SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY

To this point, this Comment has focused on the hybrid rights
doctrine generally. 9 2 This doctrine is flawed, and many have
criticized it on numerous grounds.'93 One particular application of
the hybrid rights doctrine is especially troubling: the combination of
the weak Pierce right with the weak free exercise right to attain the
strong compelling interest test in challenging a school system's
policies. As will be explored further below, even under the Smith
hybrid rights doctrine, it is inappropriate to give heightened scrutiny
to cases merging free exercise and Pierce right claims.
A.

Two "Weak" Claims

Some commentators addressing the issue of the combination of
the Pierce right with a free exercise claim under the hybrid rights
doctrine have argued that this combination should be given
heightened scrutiny.'94 One commentator, focusing on this version of
189. The evidence presented by the Amish in Yoder was especially persuasive and
detailed. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216-19 (1972). It is certainly arguable that
this detailed factual record helped lead to the Amish victory in that case, and it is
reasonable to believe that the parents in the intelligent design hypothetical would have to
produce evidence of a similar quality to prevail.
190. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
191. See discussion supra Parts I.C., II.C.
192. See discussion supra Part III.
193. See supra notes 155-84 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, Parental (and Grandparental)Rights After Troxel v.
Granville, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 69, 123-26 (2001) (claiming that intermediate scrutiny is
appropriate for parental rights claims after Troxel); Ralph D. Mawdsley, Parental Rights
and Home Schooling: Current Home School Litigation, 135 EDUC. L. REP. 313, 327 (1999)
(advocating the compelling interest test as the appropriate test for these claims); Good,
supra note 74, at 659.
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the hybrid rights doctrine in the education context, expressed her
views on the topic "mathematically," noting that a "heightened
standard of review + a heightened standard of review is _ an
'
intermediate standard of review." 195
This could potentially make
good analytical sense. Although this commentator is incorrect in
stating that pure free exercise claims receive a "heightened standard
of review,"' 96 it could be that the heightened scrutiny afforded to
hybrid claims is a result of the heightened scrutiny that would be
given to the other constitutional claim brought by the party. In this
way, the equation would read: heightened standard of review + lesser
standard of review = intermediate standard of review.
Indeed, some intermediate federal appellate courts have adopted
similar logic, only allowing a hybrid claim to proceed if the
constitutional claim merged with the free exercise claim is
independently viable.'97 Other circuits employ similar logic, applying
a less rigorous "colorable claim" approach.'98
Under both
approaches, a litigant bringing a hybrid claim must show that his nonfree exercise claim has "at least ... a colorable showing of
infringement of recognized and specific constitutional rights, rather
than the mere invocation of a general right such as the right to control
the education of one's child." 99
Henderson v. Kennedy, °° a case from the D.C. Circuit, helps
illustrate the "independently viable" test.
In that case, two
evangelical Christians purported to bring a hybrid rights claim based
on their free exercise and free speech rights after being denied the
ability to sell t-shirts on the National Mall.2"' The D.C. Circuit
rejected the hybrid claim, noting that the plaintiffs' free speech claims
were not viable. 2 The plaintiffs would therefore not be able to

195. Good, supra note 74, at 659.
196. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
197. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that
the University's hybrid claim could have been successful at trial because they had an
independently viable establishment clause claim); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc.,
68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that the plaintiffs' hybrid claim would fail because
their Pierce claim was not independently viable); see also Hensley, supra note 150, at 13032 (describing the independently viable approach to the hybrid rights doctrine).
198. See, e.g., Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 656
(10th Cir. 2006).
199. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 699-700 (10th Cir.
1998).
200. 253 F.3d 12 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
201. Id. at 13-14, 19.
202. See id. at 19.
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succeed in the free speech prong of their hybrid claim, making it
pointless to explore the merits of the claim further.2 3
Thus, the rationale for both the independently viable test and the
colorable claim test is that the non-free exercise claim in a hybrid
claim must be at least likely to win on the merits; otherwise it is a
waste of time for the court to consider it. Under these approaches,
courts have basically decided that any weight to be given to a hybrid
claim must emanate from the non-free exercise claim. The D.C.
Circuit in Henderson explained its logic:
For [the plaintiffs'] argument to prevail, one would have to
conclude that although the regulation does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause ... and although they have no viable First
Amendment claim against the regulation ... the combination of
two untenable claims equals a tenable one. But in law as in
mathematics zero plus zero equals zero.2"
The court in Henderson could not adopt a categorical rule in this
situation because, although the free speech claim of the plaintiffs in
that case failed, many free speech claims would be successful. That,
however, is not the case with the Pierceright.
Indeed, the combination of the Pierce right in the educational
context with a free exercise claim would fail under an independently
viable test or a colorable claim test in all but the most unusual of
circumstances; under this combination, neither of the claims would be
independently successful.
The Pierce right to direct a child's
upbringing (which can include certain decisions regarding a child's
education) is not treated with a "heightened standard of review."
Instead, courts have traditionally given claims based on the Pierce
right rational basis review, 05 and continue to do so in the present.0 6
While Supreme Court holdings may show a liberal trend in terms of
parental rights claims,2 7 most notably in Troxel v. Granville, a closer
examination of Troxel reveals that even in that case the Supreme
Court did not advance the standard of review for parental rights
claims beyond rational basis review.2 8
Thus, Pierce claims are unlikely ever to succeed because such
claims are neither independently viable nor colorable due to the level
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See id.
Id.
See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
See MARTIN S. SHEFFER, GOD VERSUS CAESAR:
PROSELYTIZING UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 50 (1999).
208. See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
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of scrutiny they receive. Courts have generally taken this approach.2"9
Courts addressing this issue, however, tend to be less than explicit in
stating that a Pierce claim can never succeed under the hybrid rights
doctrine. For instance, in Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School
District No. I-L,21 0 the Tenth Circuit addressed the claim of parents
who argued that their child should be allowed to go to school for half
a day and to pick and choose the classes the child would take.2 ' One
of their claims was a hybrid claim based on Pierce and the Free
Exercise Clause.212 The court in Swanson rejected this hybrid claim as
not colorable but never explicitly stated that Pierce claims could
never succeed under the hybrid rights doctrine.2 13 Instead, the court
merely noted the "limited scope" of the Pierce right, and that other
courts previously found the Pierce right to be too narrow to allow
exemptions from class requirements.2 14 Courts should be more
explicit and note that Pierce claims can never succeed under the
hybrid rights doctrine.
B.

Policy Justificationsof the Pierce Right Make Lower Scrutiny
Appropriate
The incongruous nature of the hybrid rights doctrine is further
shown when examining the policy implications for giving the Pierce
right and the free exercise right from Smith lower judicial scrutiny. In
Pierce,the Supreme Court recognized the power of the state to make
reasonable regulations regarding education,2 15 stating that Pierce
raised
[n]o question ... concerning the power of the State reasonably
to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them,
their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper
age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral
character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly
essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing
be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.2 6

209. See, e.g., Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 699-700
(10th Cir. 1998).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 696.
212. Id. at 699.
213. See id. at 699-700.
214. Id. at 699.
215. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
216. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
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This statement shows that the Supreme Court in Pierce appreciated
the need for uniformity in educational systems.
The Supreme Court's recognition of the importance of
uniformity in education regulations clarifies why the Court afforded
rational basis review to the parents' claim in Pierce.1 7 Strict scrutiny
establishes a high burden for the state to overcome. It would be
almost impossible to run a school system that had any sort of
meaningful regularity and order if any parent unhappy with a school
system's decisions could force the school system to justify its actions
under strict scrutiny. Imagine yourself as a lawyer for a school board
having to justify against strict scrutiny the school system's decision
not to include Slavic language courses in the curriculum. This would
be a nearly impossible task. Requiring the school board to defend
every such suit would tie up valuable school resources that should go
elsewhere, and the exemptions or changes to the curriculum granted
to certain students would change the key decisionmaker over the
curriculum from the school board to the parents.
Indeed, it was the Court's recognition of the necessity that the
state have power to adopt general regulations for education that
prompted the Court to craft very narrow rights in Meyer and Pierce.1 8
In Meyer, the Court held that the state could not preclude a private
school from teaching a foreign language, partly because it deprived
parents of choosing a school of their choice for their child. 1 9 Pierce
granted the right of parents to choose a private school over a public
school. 2 ' Neither case was intended to allow parents to have the
broad general right to substitute their judgment over their child's
education for the judgment of the state on this matter.2 2' Yet, as our
intelligent design hypothetical has demonstrated in its application of
the hybrid rights doctrine, this result is at least threatened by the
hybrid rights doctrine. In this way, the hybrid rights doctrine not only
turns "losers" into "winners, '"222 it also greatly expands the scope of
one of the Pierce rights beyond the policy intentions of Pierce and
Meyer.
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See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923). Of course, Pierce still allows the
regulate even private schools. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
See discussion supra Part I.C.
See Esser, supra note 183, at 219.
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While the Court may be showing signs of increasing the scope of
parental rights in some cases223 (most noticeably in Troxel), this trend
of liberality for parental rights has not occurred in the education
sphere.
Troxel addressed the distinct issue of grandparent
visitation,224 while Parham v. J.R.,225 a case often cited as representing
part of the Supreme Court's parental rights jurisprudence,22 6 dealt
with the issue of juvenile commitment. 227 In terms of Supreme Court
precedent related to the parental right to direct a child's education,
Meyer and Pierce stand alone. 228 Both cases, of course, establish
rational basis as the appropriate level of review, and both construct
very narrow rights.229
C.

Little Guidancefrom the Supreme Court on the Hybrid Rights
Doctrine

The Supreme Court's cursory treatment of the hybrid rights
doctrine does little to reassure the practitioner who must address
these issues. The Court in Smith provided limited elaboration on the
scope of the hybrid rights doctrine.
In the nearly twenty years since
Smith, the Court has only addressed the hybrid rights doctrine on two
occasions, and even then the Court did little to further explain the
doctrine. 231 As Professor McConnell predicted in the wake of Smith,
the Court has done little to show that it takes the hybrid rights
232
doctrine seriously.
The minimal guidance from the Court on this issue is even more
troublesome given the fact that the hybrid rights doctrine does not
make much sense in terms of logic, 233 policy, 234 or history. 235 The
confusion over what the hybrid rights doctrine means can be seen
223. See SHEFFER, supra note 207, at 50.
224. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60-63 (2000) (plurality opinion).
225. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
226. See, e.g., Good, supra note 74, at 660 n.137.
227. See Parham,442 U.S. at 587.
228. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), is sometimes mentioned as part of the
Pierce line of cases. It is true that the parents in that case relied on Pierce in their
arguments. The Supreme Court, however, distinguished the Pierce line of cases in
Runyon, holding that the Pierceright could not be utilized to justify racially discriminatory

private
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230.
231.
Babalu
232.
233.
234.
235.

schools. See id. at 178-79.
See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513-14 (1997); Church of the Lukumi
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566-67 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
See McConnell, supra note 24, at 1122.
See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
See supra notes 155-75 and accompanying text.
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clearly by the fact that the lower federal courts have varied greatly in
their approaches to the hybrid rights doctrine. 36 This confusion is
increased in light of combinations of the Pierce right with a free
exercise claim. Although the hybrid rights doctrine could be sound in
other contexts,237 the combination of the Pierce right and the free
exercise right, two weak claims, to form a strong hybrid claim makes
little sense analytically.3 3
For these reasons, the most prudent policy is for courts to ignore
giving heightened scrutiny to claims challenging school system
policies that combine Pierce rights with free exercise rights, despite
the apparent instructions of the Supreme Court in Smith. This has
already been the predominant approach in the lower courts, 239 but
some courts hinted in dicta that they would be open to applying
heightened scrutiny in such claims.240 When the opportunity presents
itself, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a case involving
hybrid rights to clarify the scope of the doctrine or abandon it as
unsound.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's hybrid rights doctrine makes little sense on
a general scale. It makes even less sense in the educational context
when parents meld a free exercise claim to a Pierce parental rights
claim to challenge school policy. Courts should not give hybrid claims
based on Pierce heightened scrutiny.
The lower courts struggle in their application of the hybrid rights
doctrine, making it a legal issue ripe for the Supreme Court to pick up
on certiorari. So far, however, the Supreme Court has not yet done
so, and the Justices have only addressed the hybrid rights doctrine on
two occasions since Smith. 241 Even on these occasions, the treatment
2 2
was cursory and did little to clarify the doctrine4.
The Supreme
236. See generally Hensley, supra note 150 (describing the lower federal courts'
approaches to the hybrid rights doctrine); Esser, supra note 183 (describing the lower
federal courts' approaches to the hybrid rights doctrine).
237. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
239. See Combs v. Homer Ctr. Sch. Dist., No. 04cv1599, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32007,
at *104-07 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2005) (mem.) (listing the cases in which federal courts
applied rational basis to these claims).
240. See Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 165 n.26 (3d Cir.
2002).
241. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513-14 (1997); Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566-67 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
242. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 513-14; City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 566-67 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
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Court has created a constitutional muddle with the hybrid rights
doctrine, and in order to enhance the development of constitutional
law, it should clarify whether it intended for the hybrid rights doctrine
to be taken seriously or not.243
KYLE STILL*

243. See McConnell, supra note 24, at 1122.
* I dedicate this to my parents, who have always been a constant source of support
for me.

